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In July 1999, a large international firm announced its tax
practice was "experiencing a phenomenal [twenty-five] percent
growth rate this year, creating a real need for tax professionals at
the firm."' Compared with the previous year, the firm expected to
hire double the number, up from 150 to 300, of law school
graduates and experienced tax lawyers.2 "With more than 650
professionals with law degrees currently in our U.S. tax practice,"
the firm boasted, "we believe [that we present] law school
graduates with unparalleled opportunities for growth in a practice
that offers many high-end specialty services and breakthrough
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1. Cliff Collins, The ABCs of MDP: How Multidisciplinary Practice Could
Reshape the Practice of Law, OR. ST. B. BULL., Dec. 1999, at 17, 17.
2. See id.
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strategies for leading clients worldwide."3
While this testimonial sounds as if it could belong to any of the
world's largest law firms, it in fact belongs to K.P.M.G., one of the
Big Five' accounting firms.' The Big Five accounting firms, Arthur
Andersen,6 Deloitte & Touche,7 Ernst & Young,8 K.P.M.G.,9 and
PricewaterhouseCoopers, ° employed more than 5500 non-tax
lawyers worldwide in 1999." Only two law firms in the world
employed more attorneys than PricewaterhouseCoopers, the
largest accounting employer of attorneys.'2 The increased number
3. Id.
4. Since the writing of this article, Arthur Anderson is arguably no longer
one of the "Big Five" and the "Big Five" are more accurately described as the
"Big Four." However, at the time when this article was written, available data
and commentary analyzed the MDP debate and lawyers' interactions with the
"Big Five." Therefore, for the sake of continuity with the source material, the
term "Big Five" will be used throughout this piece.
5. See Michael Schroeder, SEC, Accounting Firms Reach Pact on Conflicts,
WALL ST. J., June 8, 2000, at A2 (listing the Big Five accounting firms and their
responses to SEC guidelines on conflicts of interest).
6. See Katherine L. Harrison, Comment, Multidisciplinary Practices:
Changing the Global View of the Legal Profession, 21 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L.
879, 905 (2000) (noting that in 1998 Arthur Andersen had subsidiaries practicing
law in England, France, Spain, and Australia, and more than 1500 lawyers
working in twenty-seven different countries).
7. See id. at 906 (noting that in November 1998 Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu
had 586 lawyers working in fourteen countries, including France, Austria,
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Spain).
8. See id. (noting that in 1999 Ernst & Young had more than 850 lawyers
working in thirty-two countries, with more than 600 of those lawyers employed in
Europe).
9. See id. (noting that in 1999 K.P.M.G. employed more than 980 lawyers
worldwide).
10. See id. at 907 (noting that in 1999 PricewaterhouseCoopers "led the
pack" with more than 1600 lawyers practicing in thirty-nine countries).
11. See Collins, supra note 1.
12. See John E. Morris, The Global 50, AM. LAW., Nov. 1998, at 45, 45
(listing, in its first annual survey of global law firms, Baker & McKenzie as the
largest with 2300 lawyers, followed by Clifford Chance with 1795, Eversheds with
1290, Jones Day Reavis & Pogue with 1191, and Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher
& Flom with 1125. Id. at 46. The Big Five accounting firms were counted
separately. Id. at 45. PricewaterhouseCoopers employed the most lawyers at
1663, followed by Arthur Andersen with 1500, K.P.M.G. with 988, Ernst &
ANALYSIS OF NEW YORK MDPs
of lawyers practicing at Big Five firms has come about not only
through mergers with existing firms or practices, but also through
recruitment of individual lawyers and law school graduates. One
report indicated that as many as twenty percent of graduates at
some law schools are starting their careers at Big Five accounting
firms.'4  Now worldwide competitors of law firms, 5 these
accounting firms are aiding management'6 and expanding their
influence in transactional matters.'7
Although the lines between lawyers and accountants have long
been blurred on legal issues involving taxes, the current situation is
different. "[A]ccountants have stepped up their quest to be a full
service provider, especially to multinational clients."'" Accountants
argue they are not practicing law, but practicing "tax."' 9 However,
Young with 851, and Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu with 586. Id. at 45. These
figures include all lawyers in affiliated law firms and business lawyers in other
divisions, but not lawyers practicing tax law exclusively within the accounting or
tax divisions of the firms. Id. at 47.
13. See Laurel S. Terry, A Primer on MDPs: Should the "No" Rule Become a
New Rule?, 72 TEMP. L. REv. 869, 880 n.45 (1999) (discussing the departure of six
partners to Big Five firms and lawyers leaving firms for the attraction of
international practices); see also Donald S. Gray, Multidisciplinary Practice of
Law, ORANGE COUNTY LAW., Apr. 1999, at 4 (discussing the resignation of a
managing partner at a major San Francisco law firm to accept a position with
Ernst & Young as national director of state and local tax consulting services).
14. See Terry, supra note 13, at 880 n.46.
15. See Bernhard Grossfeld, Lawyers and Accountants: A Semiotic
Competition, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 167, 170 (2001).
16. See id. The traditional role of the lawyer was to serve as loyal insider to
senior management and to maintain their confidences. See id. The corporate
entity, and the voice and loyalty of the shareholders, were often regarded as "not
being their business." Id.
17. See A.J. Noble, Eyes on the Prize: While the Profession Debates Where to
Draw the Line Between Accountants and Lawyers, the Big Five Firms Are Already
Cozying Up to Corporate Clients, Am. LAW., June 1999, at 51, 52 (noting that
while members of the bar debate their ethics rules, accountants are taking action
by creating new products and services).
18. Gray, supra note 13, at 4.
19. But see, e.g., Debra Baker, Accounting Firm Calls for Changes in Lawyer
Conduct Rules, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1999, at 83 (quoting Lawrence J. Fox, who, in
observing the Big Five accounting firms, stated that "[t]hey say they aren't
practicing law, but they aren't practicing law the same way President Clinton was
not participating in sex. It's all semantics.").
2003]
154 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORA TE & [Vol. VIII
FINANCIAL LAW
many accountants admit that their goal is to provide the same
range of services offered by full-service law firms." Because these
attorneys purport not to be practicing law, they are largely
unregulated by the courts and administrative bodies charged with
policing the legal profession.21 Commentators argue that this
unregulated activity in multidisciplinary practices (MDPs)
undermines the integrity of professional services." Not only are
attorneys affected, but also clients and non-attorneys who are
engaged in activities that traditionally have been considered the
practice of law.23 Companies and individuals are preferring "one-
stop shopping"2 ' to decrease costs through the elimination of dual
management structures. Multidisciplinary practices have been
touted as allowing one-stop shopping, better service (because of
the broader expertise of the service providers and closer
cooperation of an interdisciplinary team), and cost-effectiveness.25
However, current ethics guidelines present many barriers to
multidisciplinary practice.
20. See Lowell J. Noteboom, Professions in Convergence: Taking the Next
Step, 84 MINN. L. REv. 1359, 1362 (2000) (observing that accountants regularly
provide employment law advice, prepare estate plans, consult on a range of
regulatory issues, assemble claims of every description, serve as advocates in
alternative dispute resolution settings, and provide litigation management
services to clients by hiring and managing lawyers for a client's litigation
matters).
21. See id. at 1362-63.
22. See, e.g., Aubrey Meachum Connatser, Comment, Multidisciplinary
Partnerships in the United States and the United Kingdom and Their Effect on
International Business Litigation, 36 TEX. INT'L L.J. 365, 374, 376 (2001).
23. See id.
24. See, e.g., Grace D. Moran, New York's Amended Code of Professional
Responsibility: A Guide to What's New, 29 HOFSTRA L. REv. 239, 244-45 (2000)
(observing that one-stop shopping firms on Long Island will be "different". "I
foresee a real estate law firm joining up with a mortgage brokerage, a real estate
agency, a title company, a general contractor, a landscaper, and an interior
decorator.").
25. See Terry, supra note 13, at 891-92 (providing a brief summary of the
arguments for and against MDPs).
26. For a succinct definition of multidisciplinary practice, see William G.
Paul, Remarks of the Outgoing President of the American Bar Association, 31
N.M. L. REv. 55, 61 (2001) (defining multidisciplinary practice as "the practice of
law through an entity that includes nonlawyer professionals as well as lawyers...
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In the United States, partnerships and fee-sharing
arrangements between lawyers and nonlawyers are generally
banned. American Bar Association ("ABA") Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 5.4 prohibits a lawyer from forming a
partnership with a nonlawyer if the partnership will engage in
activities constituting the practice of law or will involve a lawyer
sharing legal fees with a nonlawyer.' Judicial decisions28 and ethics
[in] a firm that delivers both legal and non-legal services, but in which lawyers are
members and in which lawyers are sharing fees."); see also Ted Schneyer,
Multidisciplinary Practice, Professional Regulation, and the Anti-Interference
Principle in Legal Ethics, 84 MINN. L. REv. 1469, 1469 (2000) (defining an MDP
as a firm providing "legal and other professional services to the public, and...
owned by any combination of lawyers and nonlawyers who participate in its
operations."); Robert A. Stein, Multidisciplinary Practices: Prohibit or Regulate?,
84 MINN. L. REv. 1529, 1529 (2000) (defining an MDP as "a lawyer or lawyers
having nonlawyer partners in a firm or other professional entity that provides
legal and nonlegal services").
27. Specifically, Model Rule 5.4 reads:
(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except that:
(1) an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer's firm, partner, or associate
may provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time after
the lawyer's death, to the lawyer's estate or to one or more specified persons;
(2) a lawyer who purchases the practice of a deceased, disabled or
disappeared lawyer may, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 1.17, pay to the
estate or other representative of that lawyer the agreed-upon purchase price;
and
(3) a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a
compensation or retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in
part on a profit-sharing arrangement.
(b) A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the
activities of the
partnership consist of the practice of law.
(c) A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays the
lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyers'
professional judgment in rendering such legal services.
(d) A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corporation
or association authorized to practice law for a profit, if:
(1) a nonlawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary
representative of the estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or interest of the
lawyer for a reasonable time during administration;
(2) a nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof; or
(3) a nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the professional
judgment of a lawyer.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT R. 5.4 (1999).
28. See Emmons, Williams, Mires & Leech v. State Bar of California, 86 Cal.
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opinions29 demonstrate acceptance of this general rule by courts
Rptr. 367 (Ct. App. 1970) (holding that a contract between an attorney and a
legal aid referral service was not illegal under the California ethics canons). The
court observed that the prohibited fee splitting between lawyer and layperson
carries with it the danger of "competitive solicitation," raises the possibility of
"control by the lay person" interested in his or her own profit, and facilitates the
lay intermediary's "tendency to select the most generous, not the most
competent, attorney." Id. at 372. The court also observed that "one objective of
fee-splitting prohibitions is avoidance of arrangements which unnecessarily
inflate the client's cost." Id. at 373; see also Brandon v. Newman, 532 S.E.2d 743
(Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (applying Georgia law and holding that a fee-splitting
contract was void for public policy reasons, resulting in forfeiture of the claimed
fee); "We The People" Paralegal Servs., L.L.C. v. Watley, 766 So. 2d 744 (La. Ct.
App. 2000) (applying Louisiana law and holding that although a contract to split
legal fees with a nonlawyer is illegal and unenforceable, the nonlawyer may sue
for unjust enrichment); Plume v. Paddock, 832 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. App. 1992)
(applying Texas law and holding that ambulance owner's contract, whereby
attorneys would pay owner for personal injury case referrals, was illegal and void
as against public policy); Danzig v. Danzig, 904 P.2d 312 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995)
(applying Washington law and holding that fee-sharing contracts are void while
holding it was reversible error not to permit the nonlawyer to raise the in pari
delicto exception to the general rule precluding enforcement of contracts against
public policy).
29. See, e.g., State Bar of Mont. Ethics Comm., Op. 000111 (2000) (denying
an attorney's request to maintain a legal practice while at the same time working
as an employee of a professional services organization within the same office, in
light of the ABA's rejection of MDPs), at
http://www.montanabar.org/ethics/ethicsopinions/000111.html (last visited Aug.
26, 2002); Utah State Bar Ethics Adv. Op. Comm., Op. 00-03 (2000) (applying
Utah law and stating that a lawyer who is also a real estate title officer may not
enter into a partnership with or form a small business corporation with a
nonlawyer for the purpose of assisting clients in challenging their real estate taxes
unless the lawyer withdraws entirely from the practice of law); I11. State Bar
Ass'n Adv. Op. on Prof'l Conduct, Op. 99-02 (1999) (applying Illinois law and
stating that, until the Illinois Supreme Court amends its Rules of Professional
Conduct to allow MDPs, a lawyer may not pay a nonlawyer authorized to
represent claimants in cases before the Social Security Administration ("SSA") a
fee for his or her involvement in the lawyer's representation of such claimants
before the SSA); S.C. Bar Ethics Adv. Comm., Adv. Op. 99-07 (1999) (applying
South Carolina law, stating that a lawyer may not engage in the practice of law
either in the capacity of an employee of or as an equity holder in a certified
public accounting firm); Or. State Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 1991-101
(1991) (applying Oregon law, stating that if family mediation services involve the
practicing of law, an attorney could not split fees with a nonlawyer psychologist),
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and administrative bodies. The only exceptions to this rule are
payment to a lawyer's estate after death,0 purchase of a deceased,
disabled, or disappeared lawyer's practice," or the participation of
nonlawyer employees in a compensation or retirement plan, even
though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing
agreement.32 These exceptions are designed only to benefit the
lawyer rather than the client.
Until November 2001, the District of Columbia was the only
United States jurisdiction to provide rules facilitating
multidisciplinary practice.33 One year after the ABA rejected its
commission's proposal to allow lawyers and nonlawyer
professionals to join forces in multidisciplinary practices, New
York granted its lawyers the authority to form limited
multidisciplinary alliances and other cooperative contractual
relationships with nonlawyers in November 2001." This Note will
analyze the New York approach in light of arguments for and
against MDPs. I contend that while MDPs may be an inevitable
consequence of globalization, New York's approach may
complicate the issue, allowing MDPs only in a limited context and
ignoring the existing climate for change in the legal profession.
at http://www.osbar.org/Ethics/Data/1991-101.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2002);
Alaska Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 79-3 (1979) (applying Alaska law and
stating that an accountant employed by a law firm may not be a partner and shall
be compensated by salary to avoid any violation of the disciplinary rules), at
http://www.alaskabar.org/index.cfrn?x=200 (last visited Mar. 6, 2002); Nassau
County (N.Y.) Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 99-1 (1999) (stating, under
New York's old disciplinary rule, that an ethics rule is violated whenever a




30. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (1999).
31. Id. at 5.4(a)(2).
32. Id. at 5.4(a)(3).
33. The District of Columbia's version of the rule, effective since 1991, allows
nonlawyer partners in firms under a limited set of circumstances. See D.C. RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (1999).
34. See Lance J. Rogers, Regulation of Bar: New York Modifies Rules to
Authorize Multidisciplinary Business Affiliations, 17 LAWS. MAN. ON PROF.
CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) 464,464 (Aug. 1, 2001).
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This Note has two goals. The first is to provide a positive
contribution to the MDP debate by conducting a critical analysis of
New York's regulatory approach. New York's approach will be
measured against the arguments for and against MDPs. Second,
this Note will provide four recommendations for jurisdictions that
will follow New York's lead in permitting MDPs. To make these
recommendations, this Note discusses the impact of Enron
Corporation's bankruptcy and the role of Enron's auditor, Arthur
Andersen. While some see Enron as proof that lawyers and
accountants should not work together, Enron may provide the
organized bar with both the opportunity and justification for
altering existing guidelines to permit MDPs to improve the quality
of audits and business transactions.
This Note is divided into three sections. Part I provides a brief
overview of the ABA's historical approach to MDPs and analyzes
the major arguments for and against MDPs. Part II studies the
New York approach to regulating MDPs and compares and
contrasts it with opposing views. Part III reviews alternatives for
regulating MDPs and explores how the Enron Corporation
bankruptcy influences the debate. The Note concludes with four
recommendations to increase the effectiveness of future MDP
rules.
I. A HISTORY OF MDP REGULATION35
The original Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the
ABA in 1908 did not bar fee sharing or partnership with
nonlawyers.36 Such prohibitions did not become a formal part of
the professional responsibility codes until the adoption of Canons
33 and 34 in 1928. Canon 33 outlawed partnerships between
lawyers and nonlawyers where the partnership consisted of the
35. This Note provides no more than a cursory overview of the ABA's
historical approach to fee sharing and lawyers partnering with nonlawyers. For a
more detailed historical review, see Terry, supra note 13, at 874-78; see also
Thomas R. Andrews, Nonlawyers in the Business of Law: Does the One Who Has
the Gold Really Make the Rules?, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 584 (1989) (discussing
the content and history of rules prohibiting the combination of lawyers with
nonlawyers).
36. See Terry, supra note 13, at 874.
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practice of law, while Canon 34 permitted the division of legal fees,
but only with other lawyers." From 1928 to the present, regulatory
authorities have successfully invoked these provisions and the
subsequent Model Code and Model Rules to prevent the
establishment of MDPs that offered legal services.38
In 1969, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
replaced the Canons of Professional Ethics. 39 Although the format
of the rules changed dramatically, the prohibitions on
lawyer/nonlawyer business associations remained." In 1983, the
ABA's ethics code underwent another major revision with the
adoption of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct."1 Once
again, the prohibitions against multidisciplinary practice did not
change."
In 1998, the ABA established its Commission on
Multidisciplinary Practice to examine MDPs and to deliver
recommendations on their future within the organized bar. 3 The
ABA formed this Commission in response to the growing number
of unregulated lawyers working for accounting firms and an
increase in the number of attorneys wishing to join MDPs The
twelve-member Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice studied
and reported on the manner and extent to which nonlawyer
professional service firms sought to provide legal service. 5 The
Commission gathered testimony from business clients, consumer
groups, the Big Five accounting firms, and ABA entities
representing small firms and solo practitioners. 6 In August 1999,
the commission recommended that it would be "in the best interest
37. See id. at 874.
38. See id. at 874.
39. See Andrews, supra note 35, at 588.
40. See Terry, supra note 13, at 874-75.
41. See Andrews, supra note 35, at 588.
42. See id. at 588.
43. See John M. Matheson & Peper D. Favorite, Multidisciplinary Practice
and the Future of the Legal Profession: Considering a Role for Independent
Directors, 32 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 577, 591-92 (2001).
44. See Regulation of Bar: ABA Rejects Multidisciplinary Practice, Stands
Firm Against Sharing Legal Fees, 16 LAWS. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT
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of the public" to relax ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct
5.4 to permit lawyers to offer their clients the interrelated services
of lawyers and nonlawyers in a single firm. 7 On July 11, 2000, the
ABA House of Delegates voted 314 to 106 to reject the
Commission's proposal and to adhere to the current formulation of
Model Rule 5.4,"8 the ethical codification of the current prohibition
against multidisciplinary practice.
Most states adopted Model Rule 5.4 virtually intact. 9 Prior to
New York's action, the District of Columbia was the only
jurisdiction that departed from the rule.' The District of
Columbia's version of Rule 5.4 permits nonlawyers to become
partners or shareholders of a law firm." Furthermore, the rule
permits a law firm to admit an accountant as a partner to assist the
firm with its tax practice or an economist partner to assist with
47. See id.
48. See, e.g., George V. Overston, MDP: Will It Rise from the Dead?, CHI. B.
Ass'N REc., Sept. 2000, at 62.
49. Some states adopted variations of Model Rule 5.4. See, e.g., Partnerships
With Nonlawyers, LAWS. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) No. 142
91:401-91:403 (May 18, 1994) (noting that North Carolina has no counterpart to
Rule 5.4. Illinois, Oklahoma, and the state of Washington, in their versions of
Rule 5.4(d)(2), permit nonlawyers to be corporate secretaries of professional
corporations. Washington also permits nonlawyers to be treasurers. Florida and
Kentucky have not adopted Rule 5.4(d)(2) and do not specifically prohibit
nonlawyers from serving as directors or officers of a professional corporation or
association. Utah permits a lawyer to practice in a not-for-profit public interest
corporation provided that nonlawyer directors and officers do not interfere with
a lawyer's independent professional judgment).
50. See Terry, supra note 13, at 875.
51. Specifically, Rule 5.4 reads:
A lawyer may practice law in a partnership or other form of organization in
which a financial interest is held or managerial authority is exercised by an
individual nonlawyer who performs professional services which assist the
organization in providing legal services to clients, but only if:
(1) the partnership or organization has as its sole purpose providing legal
services to clients;
(2) all persons having such managerial authority or holding a financial
interest undertake to abide by these rules of professional conduct;
(3) the lawyers who have a financial interest or managerial authority in the
partnership or organization undertake to be responsible for the
nonlawyer[s]... ;
(4) the foregoing conditions are set forth in writing.
D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4(b) (1999).
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antitrust litigation.5 2 This unique rule, however, provides little
practical guidance because MDPs are rare in that jurisdiction.
District of Columbia Ethics'Counsel Susan Gilbert has offered
several explanations for the District's infrequent use of its Rule 5.4.
First, the District of Columbia's requirement that a partnership
have as its sole purpose the provision of legal services is different
from what many MDP proposals advocate, including that of the
ABA." Second, ABA Ethics Committee Formal Opinion 91-360
narrowed the scope of the rule by concluding that a multi-
jurisdictional law firm having a District of Columbia office cannot
have a nonlawyer partner in that office.5 Gilbert concluded that
when the multi-jurisdictional firm is eliminated, the rule is
available only to "D.C.-based boutique law firms that identify a
specific need. 5 6 Therefore, there has been no effective test case
for MDPs in the United States.
A. The Rationales for MDPs
The arguments for and against MDPs are as varied as the
article titles that commentators have selected to frame the debate.
Commentators see the MDP issue as an epic struggle between
good and evil,57 while others have even compared MDPs to fast
52. See Stein, supra note 26, at 1538.




57. MDP commentators, eager to share their opinions, have described the
MDP debate in colorful terms. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Fox, Accountants, the
Hawks of the Professional World: They Foul Our Nest and Theirs Too, Plus Other
Ruminations on the Issue of MDPs, 84 MINN. L. REv. 1097, 1104 (2000) (calling
the legal profession a "priesthood" while discussing the obligations of the legal
profession compared with those of accountants); J. Emry Barker,
Multidisciplinary Practice: Armageddon or Salvation?, ARIz. ATr'Y, May 2000, at
24, 24 (observing that a "fair number of countries have already decided the issue
in favor of allowing fee sharing arrangements."); Wade Baxley, Please Mr.
Custer, I Don't Want to Go, 61 ALA. LAW. 6, 7 (2000) (comparing MDPs and
other important legal issues facing the bar to Custer's last stand); Jack F. Dunbar,
Multidisciplinary Practice Translated Means "Let's Kill All the Lawyers," 79
MICH. B.J. 64, 66 (2000) (stating the independence of the lawyer is critical to the
2003]
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food providers and department stores.8
The most touted arguments for allowing MDPs center on
client efficiency. 9 Proponents argue that clients would save both
time and money if they could employ one firm that could provide
both legal and other related services. MDPs have become a
practical solution for obtaining cost-effective, comprehensive
professional services in an increasingly deregulated market.'
Competition from deregulation and increased costs of delivery
through geographic expansion contribute to this cost surge.6 In
independence of the judiciary because "we are special. We are in the
Constitution."); Dave Foster, Comment, Get Off My Turf! Attorneys Fight
Accountants over Whether to Allow Multidisciplinary Practice, 31 TEx. TECH L.
REv. 1353, 1382 (2000) (arguing that de facto MDPs already exist necessitating
the need for lawyers to enter the conversation to help shape modem ethics rules);
John D. Messina, Comment, Lawyer + Layman: A Recipe for Disaster! Why the
Ban on MDP Should Remain, 62 U. PiTr. L. REv. 367, 384 (2000) (concluding
that MDPs "should not now, or in the future, be permitted."); Stuart S. Prince,
Comment, The Bar Strikes Back: The ABA's Misguided Quash of the MDP
Rebellion, 50 AM. U. L. REv. 245, 251 (2000) (urging the ABA to amend the
Model Rules to permit MDPs).
58. See Adam A. Shulenburger, Note, Would You Like Fries with That? The
Future of Multidisciplinary Practices, 87 IOWA L. REv. 327, 329 (2001) (arguing
that limited forms of MDPs will continue to exist despite the ABA's lack of
support); see also Nancy J. Moore, Lawyering for the Middle Class, 70 FORDHAM
L. REV. 623, 634 (2001) (observing that if MDPs are permitted, Sears may enter
the market and begin offering legal services, providing expanded access to the
middle class). Contra Lawrence J. Fox, The Argument Against Change, R.I. B.J.,
Apr. 2000, at 17, 49 (fearing that dysfunction might befall Sears if its lawyer
employees are supporting the Legal Services Corporation, the funder of
consumer complaints on behalf of the indigent).
59. See Edieth Y. Wu, Why Say No to Multidisciplinary Practice, 32 LoY. U.
CHI. L.J. 545, 552 (2001).
60. See Talha A. Zobair, Multidisciplinary Practices- Firms of the Future, 79
MICH. B.J. 64, 65 (2000) (observing that as the demand for highly specialized
service providers increases, so does the cost of providing such services).
61. See id. The demand for highly specialized service providers has also
increased as firms expand into unfamiliar markets. Id. These experts now need
more formal training and experience to meet the demands of their business
clients. Id. Thus, as the demand for highly skilled professionals is increasing, the
cost of obtaining and retaining such individuals is growing. Id. Cost-conscious
clients, in an effort to eliminate transaction costs associated with "employing
multiple professional organizations to resolve overlapping business problems"
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fact, some commentators argue that lawyers already integrate
professional services in an informal context when they hire jury
consultants, investigators, economic analysts, and other experts.62
Increases in the number of international mergers, acquisitions, and
other complex business transactions have led clients to seek out
more efficient and cost-effective ways of obtaining professional
services.63 One commentator argues this is what accounting firms
do now by seeking to combine legal counsel, audit and tax services,
information consulting, financial planning, litigation support, and
other professional services.' The overall impact, argue such
proponents, is a reduction in client costs.65
A corollary to this argument is that as the world becomes
more complex, client problems are becoming more complex.
Proponents of MDPs argue that clients need to obtain professional
services from a single provider, given an increase in the complexity
of both law and business.66 The problems of clients are not just
legal anymore.67  Recent developments in technology, the
are turning to MDPs to obtain "the optimal delivery of various services." Id.
62. See Wu, supra note 59.
63. See Randall S. Thomas et al., Megafirms, 80 N.C. L. REv. 115, 172 (2001)
(noting that the demand for MDPs is driven by the client's sense that these
arrangements would be a more efficient, less costly way to deal with complex
matters that have legal, management, and accounting issues).
64. See Robert A. Prentice, The SEC and MDP: Implications of the Self-
Serving Bias for Independent Auditing, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1597, 1599 (2000).
Professor Prentice discusses behavioral studies showing that, overwhelmingly,
people tend to behave inequitably if it benefits them and they think they can get
away with it. Id. This behavior is known as the self-serving bias and Prentice
examines this bias in the context of the MDP debate. Id.
65. Specifically:
Proponents of MDPs argue that MDPs benefit clients because the ability to
retain an organization whose staff can handle all of the legal and extralegal
issues involved in a client's representation increases efficiency. The proponents
argue that MDPs cause clients to need only one firm and, thus, reduce clients'
costs because there is only one company to instruct, communication between
members of the same firm is better, there is a better liaison between advisors,
and projects are streamlined.
Gianluca Morello, Note, Big Six Accounting Firms Shop Worldwide for Law
Firms: Why Multidisciplinary Practices Should Be Permitted in the United States,
21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 190,238 (1997).
66. See Matheson & Favorite, supra note 43, at 597.
67. See Jennifer R. Garcia, Comment, Multidisciplinary Practices: What Is
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globalization of the economy, and governmental regulation of
commercial and private activities have changed the ways in which
clients request legal service.68 Instead of taking the time to contact,
visit, and contract with multiple professional firms, the modern
client has an interest, in terms of both quality of service and
efficiency, in obtaining legal, financial, and other professional
services from a single entity. 69 This model allows for better service
because of the expertise of service providers and the close
cooperation of interdisciplinary teams."
Steve Bennett, corporate counsel to one of the United States's
ten largest banks, has observed that client problems are not just
"legal" problems, but often require a multidisciplinary approach.7'
As a result, the practice of law has evolved to a point where
lawyers are influential advisors to companies that are considering
complex global issues that involve "tax, environment, labor,
politics, economic infrastructure, and so on." 2  As one
commentator has observed, the modem client has "a significant
interest" in access to a single firm providing financial, legal, and
other services.73
The overall goal of MDPs is the reduction of transaction costs.
This decrease in transaction costs would come from a reduction of
duplicated efforts, elimination of the need for professionals in each
firm to consult one another in costly conferences and meetings, and
a reduction in the need for two firms to bill a sufficient amount to
ensure that the transaction is viable from business and liability
perspectives.74 By employing persons of different skill levels,
Wrong with the Legal Profession's Ethics Rules?, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 629, 647
(2000) (observing that today's clients are more sophisticated and the issues they
bring before attorneys are more complex).
68. See id. at 647-84.
69. See Matheson & Favorite, supra note 43, at 597.
70. See Terry, supra note 13, at 891.
71. See id.
72. Tim Wells, A Conversation with David Wilkins, WASH. LAW., Dec. 2001,
at 30 (observing that "it's obvious that MDPs are here to stay" and suggesting
that it is in the interest of the bar to consider forms of MDP regulation).
73. Edward S. Adams, Not "If" But "How": Reflecting on the ABA
Commission's Recommendations on Multidisciplinary Practice, 84 MINN. L. REv.
1269, 1269 (2000).
74. See John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, Multidisciplinary Practice
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MDPs could further lower transaction costs." Some MDP
opponents argue, however, that there may be a conflict between
the desire to provide MDP service and protecting client interests.76
Another way to view the MDP debate is through law and
economics analysis. This school of thought argues that the
availability of legal services to consumers should be dictated by the
market, unrestricted by barriers in the form of governing rules.'
Under this view, legal ethics rules are viewed no differently than
those of any other interest group or trade union pursuing economic
protectionism. 8 Consequently, advocates of existing bans on
and the American Legal Profession: A Market Approach to Regulating the
Delivery of Legal Services in the Twenty-First Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 83,
118-19 (2000) (noting that few service providers will want to undertake joint
liability when the reward for representation is relatively small).
75. See id. at 119. Other reduced costs would include search, contracting,
coordination, monitoring, and information costs. Id. MDPs are also more likely
to employ persons of varying skills and billing rates. Id. With this approach, a
person doing routine tasks, such as basic mathematical calculations, is billed at a
lower rate than a more skilled professional who performs such calculations
incidental to the performance of his or her work. Id. "Specifically, a consumer of
professional services may realize the benefit of reduced consumption related
costs" when dealing with an MDP that is in position to "offer a variety of services
and specialists in one location." Id.
76. Symposium, Multidisciplinary Practice, 20 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 153, 159-60 (2000). Mr. Shestack tells a story illustrating this point:
It reminds me of a story of the time that Sherlock Holmes and Dr. Watson went
camping. They put up a very nice tent and went hiking, and then they prepared
dinner by the campfire. Later, they retired on their sleeping mattresses. About
midnight, Holmes awoke and turned to Watson and said, "Watson, look up at
the sky and those beautiful stars and tell me what thought occurs to your." And
Watson says, "Well Holmes, I think of the Majesty of the heavens and the glory
of the Creator... what thought occurs to you?" And Holmes said, "I look up
at the starts, and it occurs to me that someone stole out tent."
Id. The concern is that the MDP will benefit business partners more than the
MDP will benefit clients and that what is happening is a "cloaking" of a business
plan by the Big Five in the guise of client service and development. Id. at 160.
77. See Sydney M. Cone, III, Views of Multidisciplinary Practice with
Particular Reference to Law and Economics, New York, and North Carolina, 36
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1, 4-5 (2001).
7& See id. The law and economics school is selective in its choice of the
economic consideration that is of primary significance in the marketplace for
professional legal services. The "paramount economic consideration" is freedom
of ownership and investment "uncomplicated by any consideration of how-this
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MDPs are said to be "defending their economic turf."79
A comparative analysis of the legal and accounting professions
in other countries shows that other parts of the world are willing to
allow MDPs. ° This may be the most compelling reason to permit
MDPs in the United States. Many argue that the legal profession
in the United States must adapt to "marketplace competition as it
becomes globalized and remove those regulations that restrict its
participation.'' For the ABA to insure its relevancy on this issue
internationally, it may have to move in the direction of regulating
MDPs" While the issue is debated here in the United States, "the
Big Five accounting titans are avidly acquiring law firms in dozens
of cities in Europe, where restrictions on law practice are often less
stringent.*8 3
While MDP acceptance is not universal in Europe, many
European countries embrace MDPs.84 European lawyers and
freedom" affects clients. Id. at 5. As far as the law and economics school is
concerned, the possible variation in legal product in the different economic
contexts "is of less importance than is ownership of the means of production of
that product." Id. The approach is "hardly consumer oriented." Id.
79. Id. The law and economics school is not concerned with MDPs in the
sense of the actual availability to consumers of efficiently coordinated services;
rather, it focuses on ownership of the firm enterprise. Id. at 6.
80. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 88, 92, 96, 104.
81. Adams, supra note 73, at 1300.
82. Robert K. Christensen, At the Helm of the Multidisciplinary Practice Issue
after the ABA's Recommendation: States Finding Solutions by Taking Stock in
European Harmonization to Preserve Their Sovereignty in Regulation of the Legal
Profession, 2001 BYU L. REV. 375, 377 (observing that "by withdrawing national
support from the exploration of MDP alternatives, the ABA has surrendered an
important role in developing a meaningful approach to the multidisciplinary
practice issue.").
83. Margaret A. Jacobs, Hybrid Law Practices in the US. Debated, WALL ST.
J. EUR., May 31, 2000, at 6; see also G. Ellis Duncan, Comment, The Rise of
Multidisciplinary Practices in Europe and the Future of the Global Legal
Profession Following Arthur Andersen v. Netherlands Bar Ass'n, 9 TUL. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 537, 542 (2001) (noting that the Big Five have built extensive legal
networks across Europe, currently providing legal services in Spain, France, Italy,
Germany, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Sweden, and Austria).
84. See infra text accompanying notes 88-96. Cf. Ramon Mullerat,
Multidisciplinary Practices and the Public Interest: Is There a Possible Solution?,
15 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 31, 38 (2001). The Dutch Bar Association ruled
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accountants boast of the financial efficiencies achieved by hiring
MDP firms. For example, Peter Friedli, a Swiss venture capitalist,
stopped using a traditional Swiss law firm and hired K.P.M.G.'s
MDP in Zurich." As a result, he estimates that his company, New
Venturetec AG, saved twenty percent, or sixty thousand dollars, in
legal, tax, and audit fees when it went public on the Swiss Stock
Exchange." The savings came from swifter service, rather than
from lower rates, says Mr. Friedli.'
German MDPs have existed for many years. While much of
that association of its members with auditors breached legal ethics rules. Id. A
Dutch court decided in favor of the Bar's position. Id. In August 1999, the Dutch
Appeal Court referred the matter to the European Court of Justice in
Luxembourg. See Paul Hofheinz, Deals & Deal Markers: Accounting Firms Can't
Bundle Legal and Auditing Services, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2002, at C16.
Specifically:
Europe's highest court backed a Dutch ban on bundling auditing and legal
services as accounting firms face criticism for straying from their traditional role
of certifying the accuracy of corporate books.
The U.S. already restricts the bundling of legal advice and accounting
services, but the ruling by the European Court of Justice could be a blow to
accounting firms hoping the U.S. might someday relax those rules. For nearly a
decade, U.S. accounting firms have lobbied the American Bar Association to
drop the U.S. ban, arguing that clients would prefer so-called one-stop
shopping, in which they could get legal advice and accounting services from the
same firm. Five European Union countries have banned the practice as well,
although it is legal in Germany and Italy.
Neither Europe nor the U.S. currently ban the linking of accounting and
consulting services, which has been scrutinized by regulators and lawmakers
since the bankruptcy of Enron Corp. in December. Arthur Andersen LLP, a
U.S. affiliate of Anderson Worldwide, provided both auditing and financial-
consulting services to Enron, and critics in the U.S. Congress have questioned
whether Andersen might have had an incentive to ignore questionable Enron
accounting for fear of losing lucrative consulting work.
The European Court of Justice said it may be "necessary for the proper
practice of the legal profession" that lawyers not be allowed to team up with
accountants to offer collaborative services. The ruling applies to restrictions
placed on law firms, not accounting firms. But lawyers said it could set a
European standard on exactly what services accountants can legally offer in the
EU.
Id.
85. See Duncan, supra note 83.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See Martin Henssler & Laurel S. Terry, Lawyers Without Frontiers-A
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the MDP debate has centered on the Big Five accounting firms,
many MDPs in Germany are small or mid-sized firms with a
handful of lawyers, accountants, and tax advisors serving the needs
of local communities.89 Some commentators, however, have
observed that the motivations for forming MDPs in Germany and
the United States might be different.' In Germany, the driving
force may be the ability to offer seamless, one-stop service.9 While
confidentiality is a major concern of MDP opponents, there is less
concern about this issue in Germany because "training, values, and
obligations" of auditors, lawyers, and tax advisors are very similar. 2
Given that these professions are "highly respected" and "heavily
regulated," it has never been submitted that the standards could
erode because lawyers are allowed to form partnerships with
auditors or tax advisors.93 It is important to note, however, that
German law, unlike that in the United States, does not impose on
the auditor the obligation to disclose to authorities certain matters
found during the course of an audit." Hence, the problem of
conflicting disclosure requirements and confidentiality obligations
of partners in the same firm is eased.95
In France, accounting firms rely on a law allowing drafters of
legal documents called "conseil juridique" to offer drafting services
to their clients. Accounting firms hire these drafters as
employees.97 French law also allows accounting firms to affiliate
with independent law firms or networks of firms.98 Recently,
View from Germany, 19 DICK. L. REv. 269, 295 (2001).
89. See id. at 296.
90. See id.
91. See id. MDP proponents in the United States offer the same justification
relied on by German regulators.
92. See id. at 297; see also Laurel S. Terry, German MDPs: Lessons to Learn,
84 MINN. L. REv. 1547, 1551 (2000) (providing a brief history of the development
of MDPs in Germany).
93. See Henssler & Terry, supra note 88, at 297.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 298. While these drafters technically are not lawyers as we
would think of them in the United States, they nonetheless perform services
comparable to the document drafting function of American lawyers.
96. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 74, at 115.
97. See id.
9& See id.
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France merged the two legal professions ("advocats" and "conseil
juridique") to form one unified profession." Since that time, it has
become common for accounting firms to affiliate with or acquire
the combined law firms.'"° The French rules have led to accounting
firms' use of the "captive" law firm arrangement.' A "captive"
law firm remains separate in structure from the accounting firm,
but the two firms share the same client base and often provide
indistinguishable services in a unified manner.'" The accounting
firm often provides the law firm with accounting support, and the
law firm provides the accounting firm with legal services. The
partner in charge of the Paris office of Archibald Andersen
Association d'Advocats, a French law firm associated with Arthur
Andersen, observed that they provide all the typical services of a
business law firm.103
MDPs are not confined to Europe.' The International
Practice of Law Committee and the National MDPs Committee of
the Canadian Bar Association have recommended that lawyers be
permitted to share fees with nonlawyers and enter into
partnerships with nonlawyers as long as the lawyers continue to
respect traditional rules of professional conduct. 5 The Federation
of Law Societies of Canada recommended a national approach to
MDPs and even wrote a "Draft Model Rule for Multi-Disciplinary





103. See Jeffery M. Jones, Comment, Bend, but Don't Break: MDP Proposal
Bends in the Right Direction, but- Crack!!- Goes Too Far, 54 SMU L. REv. 395,
398-99 (2001) (noting that similar associations, operating in the absence of
regulation, exist in Ireland, Scotland, and South Africa).
104. See, e.g., Zobair, supra note 60 (stating that MDP activities are increasing
in Africa, Asia, and Latin America).
105. See Mullerat, supra note 84, at 36 (discussing the state of MDPs in Spain,
England and Wales, and Belgium). The Spanish General Council for Lawyers
(Consejo General de la Abogacia Espanola) proposed a draft for a new General
Statute for Lawyers (Estatuto General de la Abogacia) in 1997. The Statute
permits MDPs as long as they group together professions compatible with the
legal profession. Id.
106. See Terry, supra note 13, at 888-89.
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of lawyers and nonlawyers."'7
The Law Council of Australia, an organization similar to the
ABA, adopted a policy in December 1998 endorsing MDPs and
calling on Australian states and territories to remove existing
restrictions on this business form.' Prior to the vote of the
Council, the Legal Ombudsman of Victoria issued a report that
endorsed a change in the regulations to permit MDPs. 9  As a
result of these regulatory changes, several of the Big Five
accounting firms either have opened or are contemplating opening
new offices in Australia."'
The existence of MDPs in other countries"' is one of the most
powerful justifications offered for relaxing the current MDP ban in
the United States.' Lawyers cannot hide behind the high ideals of
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and hope ethics will help
them survive the competition."' Regulators in the United States
have three options with regard to MDPs: (1) ignore their existence,
(2) ban them altogether, or (3) regulate them."' If one chooses to
ignore the current existence of MDPs, the result will be two
107. See id. at 889.
108. See id. at 886.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See Ronald A. Landen, Comment, The Prospects of the Accountant-
Lawyer Multidisciplinary Partnership in English-Speaking Countries, 13 EMORY
INT'L L. REV. 763, 820 (1999). Australia already has multidisciplinary
partnerships and the United Kingdom will likely soon follow with a model similar
to Australia's. Id. Additionally, the legal system in the United Kingdom allows
for easier transition as a result of the separation of barristers and solicitors. Id. at
821. This makes multidisciplinary alliances possible. Id.; see also Zobair, supra
note 60 (reporting that Big Five firms have already implemented MDPs through
the acquisition of law firms, resulting in parallel firms and the institution of
varying degrees of integrated practices in Europe, Canada, and Australia).
112. See, e.g., Caryn Langbaum, Will Attorneys Vote Themselves Out of the
Competition, NEV. LAW., July 2000, at 20, 22-23 (asserting that the existence in
Europe of MDPs shows that there is demand for integrated professional
services).
113. See id. at 23.
114. See Terry, supra note 13, at 920 (discussing the "pragmatic" approach to
MDPs and observing that regulation is the best option in order to ensure that the
bar remains relevant in the MDP debate).
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distinct groups of lawyers: those regulated and those unregulated. "5
This will likely result in the dilution of the ability of the organized
bar to have meaningful influence on the business lawyer. "6
Lawyers practicing in traditional law firms acknowledge that, while
practicing law, they are bound by applicable ethics rules."'7 In
contrast, if regulators choose to ignore MDPs and maintain the
current ethics structure, lawyers practicing in MDPs must claim
they are not practicing law; to do otherwise would subject them to
discipline for a violation of Rule 5.4. Forcing lawyers to claim they
are not practicing law would lead to a "dangerous world" in which
some lawyers were regulated while others were not, leading to a
"disrespect for the law and legal ethics rules" which might create
"a race to the bottom.""' 8 The only question is, therefore, whether
the organized bar will play a constructive role in regulating MDPs
or whether it will lose control over the delivery of legal services by
U.S. lawyers both domestically and abroad."9
MDP proponents argue that a multidisciplinary structure
would provide law firms with access to new capital, which is
increasingly necessary as expensive technology plays a larger role
in the delivery of legal services.1 As it stands today, equity
partners provide all the financing for law firms.' While law firms
are typically characterized as non-capital intensive, increasing
115. See id. at 920.
116. See Adams, supra note 73, at 1298 (quoting a lawyer who observed,
"[W]e are all paranoid about driving our clients into the arms of other
professionals and that's one of the reasons we are [pushing MDP reform].").
117. See Terry, supra note 13, at 920.
118. Id.
119. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 74, at 90 (arguing that a narrowly
tailored system of MDP regulation will accomplish the important goals of
satisfying client demand for multidisciplinary services while protecting the
legitimate interests of the legal profession in preserving its core values); see also
Dunbar, supra, note 57, at 65 (discussing Michigan and observing that the state
bar can "take the lead in addressing the need to regulate MDPs by leading the
dialogue"). Contra Christopher J. Whelan, Ethics Beyond the Horizon: Why
Regulate the Global Practice of Law, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 931, 949 (2001)
(arguing that a set of global professional ethical regulations that assert core
values may not only be unnecessary, but counterproductive).
120. See Adams, supra note 73, at 1300-01.
121. See id.
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technology needs are changing this dynamic. '22 Furthermore, the
notion that law firms have insignificant capital requirements fails to
recognize that many law firms are investing significant amounts of
money in training and developing young associates. Allowing law
firms access to equity markets through investment by nonlawyers
could result in firms that are more optimally capitalized and
therefore more efficient."n
B. The Arguments Against MDPs
The underlying rationale for the traditional MDP prohibition
is contained in the official comments to Rule 5.4."' One key
concern is the preservation of a lawyer's independent professional
judgment." When a lawyer has intimate strategic and financial
attachments to nonlegal professionals, opponents argue, there are
bound to be "obstacles to independent judgment."'26  This
argument, however, suffers from a fundamental flaw: law firms are
in the business of providing sound legal services and judgment to
clients every day. Failing to provide the highest quality counsel to
clients will have an adverse impact on a firm's ability to compete
for business. While conceding that MDPs might make the delivery
of legal and nonlegal services more efficient, critics say that this




124. See infra text accompanying note 125.
125. See Terry, supra note 13, at 874; see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 87-355 (1987) (stating that the MDP
prohibition avoids the possibility of a nonlawyer's interference with exercise of a
lawyer's independent professional judgment and ensures that the total fee paid
by clients will not be unreasonably high); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l
Responsibility, Informal Op. 86-1519 (1986) (noting that the prohibition protects
against possible control by nonlawyers of a lawyer's professional judgment and
avoids encouraging nonlawyers to engage in unauthorized practice of law).
126. Adams, supra note 73, at 1302.
127. See Lawrence J. Fox, Old Wine in Old Bottles: Preserving Professional
Independence, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 971, 984 (1999). Fox compares the MDP debate
to law enforcement. He explains that repealing the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments would make law enforcement more efficient and effective, while at
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Another concern is the perceived risk of conflict between the
ethical obligations of lawyers with respect to confidentiality and
those of accountants. For example, opponents argue that there is a
fundamental conflict between a lawyer's duty of confidentiality and
an accountant's duty to go public.'28 U.S. securities laws require
accountants to disclose audit irregularities to the Securities and
Exchange Commission if a company does not quickly correct a
problem. '29 By contrast, lawyers are bound by their ethics rules to
protect confidential client information.3 Under current ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, lawyers have discretion to
reveal client confidences only under limited circumstances.'
However, the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
governs "a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a
lawyer."'3 Without making any changes to this existing rule,
lawyers are responsible for those they employ, retain, or associate
with in a professional capacity. Part C of the rule states that a
lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person if "the
lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the specific conduct,
ratifies the conduct involved."'33 Therefore, in an MDP situation, a
lawyer could be disciplined if the lawyer has knowledge of
wrongful conduct engaged in by the other professional, including
the same time eroding civil liberties. Id. Analogizing to MDPs, Fox observes that
repealing ABA Model Rule 5.4 would allow lawyers to work with "accountants,
financial planners, insurance agents, tow truck operations, and morticians." Id.
However, Fox asserts that by permitting these types of lawyer/nonlawyer
partnerships, lawyers would sacrifice independent professional judgment,
confidentiality, and loyalty, and concludes by noting that the safeguards lost
would be just as great a loss to the American public as the repeal of our
constitutional rights. Id.
128. See Terry, supra note 13, at 892.
129. See Matheson & Favorite, supra note 43, at 601.
130. See id.
131. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.6 (1999). The rule states, in
relevant part, that a lawyer "shall not reveal information relating to
representations of a client." Id. A lawyer, may, however, reveal confidences to
the extent necessary to "prevent the client from committing a criminal act that
the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily
harm" or to defend actions brought by the client against the lawyer. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1.6(c)(1).
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that lawyer's partner(s).
Opponents further argue that MDPs will lead to a loss of
zealous representation and advocacy, 4 with too much focus on the
financial aspect of MDPs. The fear is that management by
nonlawyers of lawyers' work will lead to a decrease in the efforts of
attorneys to advocate vigorously for their clients as the focus for
MDP firms shifts from high-quality representation to the bottom
line. '35 However, this assumption rests on the false premise that
"adversarial advocacy is the sole function of lawyers."' 6
Traditional equity partner law firms are trusted to protect their
clients' interests, and MDP opponents offer no explanation why
this would be different in an MDP.'37  Otherwise, these
professionals would quickly find their client base exhausted.
Furthermore, it is "important to recognize that accountants,
consultants, doctors, and other professionals have ethics too."'3
Another concern raised by MDP opponents is that consumers'
freedom to obtain the best services would be jeopardized because
consumers would be pressured to choose their internal service
providers rather than engaging the services of another firm. 9 The
134. See Peter C. Kostant, Paradigm Regained: How Competition from
Accounting Firms May Help Corporate Attorneys to Recapture the Ethical High
Ground, 20 PACE L. REv. 43, 66 (2000).
135. See, e.g., Dennis J. Tuchler, Unavoidable Conflicts of Interest and the
Duty of Loyalty, 44 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 1025, 1028 n.11 (2000). The author
observes that one of the objections to MDPs is that decisions as to services
offered or courses of actions to be pursued might be influenced by monetary
concerns rather than independent professional judgment. Id. It is unclear,
however, how this is any different from the motivations of a non-MDP law firm.
Either firm has a market driven motivation to provide high quality services to
satisfy client needs.
136. See Kostant, supra note 134.
137. See, e.g., Gerard J. Clark, American Lawyers in the Year 2000: An
Introduction, 33 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 293, 311 (2000) (describing some examples
of full service MDPs such as a bankruptcy firm offering clients legal, accounting,
factoring, and receivership services; or an environmental firm offering legal
services as well as detection and engineering services, supervision of clean-up,
and certification of results to the relevant governmental agency).
138. Wells, supra note 72, at 31 (noting that we are "so concerned about
protecting them [clients] that we're suggesting that they ... [lack] the ability to
choose between an MDP and a law firm").
139. See Morello, supra note 65, at 242.
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opponents argue this that is a problem because an MDP could
offer the best services in one area while being deficient in others.'"
Opponents further assert that there will be pressure on lawyers to
promote nonlawyer personnel when advising clients because of the
financial commitment MDPs make to nonlawyer personnel.' This
argument assumes that the client is unsophisticated' 2 and will be
unable to determine on its own which firms provide the best
services. However, the debate has never been about how best to
"help Mom and Dad plan their retirement."' 3 The debate is about
"high-end lawyers" who want to merge with other high-end
financial professionals to compete more effectively for the business
of "the Masters of the Universe."'" Oftentimes, clients are in the
best position to make the judgment on whether the MDP firm is
best capable of representing their other interests. At the very least,
it is difficult to accept the argument that the organized bar is most
suited to determine the best interests of sophisticated clients.
Opponents of MDPs assert that the preservation of the current
prohibition in Rule 5.4 is "essential to preserving the core values of
the legal profession."'" They argue that lifting the restrictions
140. See id.
141. See id. (stating, for example, that a former Coopers partner explained
that Coopers's French audit unit would strongly urge clients to work with
Coopers's in-house tax and legal division in France. This was problematic
because "Coopers in France was not always the best in a particular area.").
142 See supra text accompanying note 67.
143. David Luban, No Rules?; Considering Values Asking the Right Questions,
72 TEMP. L. REv. 839, 840 (1999).
144. Id. at 840-41.
The Masters of the Universe did not acquire their riches by being dumb
negotiators in their own self-interest, and they scarcely need the solicitude of
the organized bar, which cannot claim to understand their interests better than
they do. The rich really aren't like you and me, and they transact their business
with lawyers and bankers out of sight of our speculations. We don't really know
how they view their lawyers or what they say to them; why second-guess them,
then? We find similar phenomena in nature. Two miles beneath the placid
surface of the Pacific Ocean, far removed from the eyes of observers, the sperm
whale and the giant squid grapple in silent combat. Moby Dick has no need of
ABA commissions worrying that the squid may use an illegal hold. Moby Dick
knows what to do.
Id.
145. See James W. Jones & Bayless Manning, Getting at the Root of Core
Values: A "Radical" Proposal to Extend the Model Rules to Changing Forms of
2003]
176 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. VIII
FINANCIAL LAW
would significantly weaken the profession and would compromise
the interests of clients, for whom the protections of the Model
Rules were primarily designed."6 MDP opponents further argue
for maintaining the current rule to preserve the legal profession's
tradition of quality and loyalty to its clients.' 7 Opponents also
express concerns that MDPs will steer law clients to nonlawyer
professionals within the MDP firm for nonlegal problems, even if a
more qualified nonlawyer professional could be found outside the
MDP.48  As a consequence, MDPs would erode attorney
independence, client loyalty, and confidentiality, ultimately having
a harmful impact on the public' 9 and reflecting negatively on the
profession. MDP proponents counter, however, by arguing that
the American bar is motivated by a desire to maintain control and
autonomy over access to legal services, "especially the billions of
dollars of fees they produce annually. '
Legal Practice, 84 MINN. L. REv. 1159, 1185 (2000); see also Nancy L. Kaszak,
Practicing Law in the Global Economy, 22 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 1, 14 (2001) (noting
that opponents argue that MDPs would undermine the core values of
independence and loyalty); John Freeman, Uncaring "Professionals," S.C. LAW.,
May/June 2001, at 11, 13 (stating "accountants and lawyers are not on the same
wavelength professionally when it comes to accountability to clients."); Bradley
G. Johnson, Note, Ready or Not, Here They Come: Why the ABA Should Amend
the Model Rules to Accommodate Multidisciplinary Practices, 57 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 951, 965 (2000) (observing that MDPs could adversely affect the legal
profession by compromising a lawyer's professional independence of judgment).
146. See supra note 144.
147. See Garrett Glass & Kathleen Jackson, The Unauthorized Practice of
Law: The Internet, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Multidisciplinary Practices,
14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1195, 1201 (2001) (observing that proponents contend
current times necessitate acceptance of MDPs to meet market demands, remain
competitive, and service clients).
148. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 74, at 141.
149. See Victoria Kremski, Multidisciplinary Practices and the Main Street
Lawyer, 79 MICH. B.J. 1196, 1196 (2000) (observing that MDP opponents argue
that a lawyer's professional judgment is subject to "erosion" in an MDP setting,
as the competing interests of other partners may impede the lawyer's ability to
give sound advice).
150. See Connatser, supra note 22, at 374 (observing that yielding to rules and
regulations of other professions, while not attempting to draft rules of their own,
would effectively "relinquish the cherished place in society that the American
lawyer has occupied for centuries").
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II. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF NEW YORK'S MDP RULES
In April 2000, a New York State Bar Association special
committee issued a detailed report recommending modifications to
the state's ethics code to permit limited forms of MDPs. The
mission of the special committee was to "consider the present law
and its effectiveness" and to consider the costs and benefits of any
potential changes to rules governing multidisciplinary practice."'
Over a six-month period the committee identified and researched
six areas deemed helpful in making recommendations on MDPsY2
The report, "Preserving the Core Values of the American Legal
Profession: The Place of Multidisciplinary Practice in the Law
Governing Lawyers," resulted in the promulgation of New York
Code of Professional Responsibility DR 1-106 and 1-107.' 53
On November 1, 2001, when its new rules took effect following
approval by the four Appellate Divisions of the New York
Supreme Court, New York became the first state to permit
MDPs.'5" A critical analysis of the rules shows their limited scope
and less than enthusiastic endorsement of multidisciplinary
practice. The New York rules still prohibit nonlawyers from
holding any ownership or interest in law firms, sharing legal fees
with lawyers, and directing the professional judgment of lawyers.'
While these new New York rules are a move forward, the
following discussion demonstrates how other jurisdictions can
151. Preserving the Core Values of the American Legal Profession: The Place
of Multidisciplinary Practice in the Law Governing Lawyers, Apr. 2000, at 1
(Report of the New York State Bar Association Special Committee on the Law
Governing Firm Structure and Operation), at
www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/mdpl.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2002) [hereinafter
Preserving Core Values].
15Z Id. at 2. The committee examined the following subject areas in depth:
post-World War II changes in the American legal profession, "articulation and
enforcement of professional values"; lawyers working with other professionals;
nonlawyers involvement in the practice of law; developments abroad relating to
multidisciplinary practice; and "factors that look toward change in the existing
law governing lawyers." Id.
153. See Steven C. Krane, End Game, N.Y. ST. B.J., Sept. 2001, at 5, 5.
154. See Rogers, supra note 34.
155. See id. (noting that the New York approach permits MDPs without
"giving away the store").
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improve upon the important foundation constructed by New York.
New York's new Model Code of Professional Responsibility
DR 1-106 governs the provision of nonlegal services by lawyers or
law firms, either directly or through companies that they own or
control. 156 For purposes of this rule, "nonlegal services" are
"services that lawyers may lawfully provide and that are not
prohibited as an unauthorized practice of law when provided by a
nonlawyer." '157 For example, a lawyer with appropriate licenses
156. Specifically, DR 1-106 reads:
Responsibilities Regarding Nonlegal Services
(a) With respect to lawyers or law firms providing nonlegal services to clients or
other persons:
(1) A lawyer or law firm that provides nonlegal services to a person that
are not distinct from legal services being provided to that person by the lawyer
or law firm is subject to these Disciplinary Rules with respect to the provision
of both legal and nonlegal services.
(2) A lawyer or law firm that provides nonlegal services to a person that
are distinct from legal services being provided to that person by the lawyer or
law firm is subject to these Disciplinary Rules with respect to the nonlegal
services if the person receiving the services could reasonably believe that the
nonlegal services are the subject of an attorney-client relationship.
(3) A lawyer or law firm that is an owner, controlling party or agent of, or
that is otherwise affiliated with, an entity that the lawyer or law firm knows to
be providing nonlegal services to a person is subject to these Disciplinary Rules
with respect to the nonlegal services if the person receiving the services could
reasonably believe that the nonlegal services are the subject of an attorney-
client relationship.
(4) For purposes of [this section] ... it will be presumed that the person
receiving nonlegal services believes the services to be the subject of an
attorney-client relationship unless the lawyer or law firm has advised the person
receiving the services in writing that the services are not legal services and that
the protection of an attorney-client relationship does not exist with respect to
the nonlegal services, or if the interest of the lawyer or law firm in the entity
providing nonlegal services is de minimis.
(b) [A] lawyer or law firm that is an owner, controlling party, agent, or is
otherwise.., affiliated with an entity that the lawyer or law firm knows is
providing nonlegal services to a person shall not permit any nonlawyer
providing such services or affiliated with that entity to direct or regulate the
professional judgment of the lawyer or law firm in rendering legal services to
any person, or to cause the lawyer or law firm to compromise its duty.., with
respect to the confidences and secrets of a client receiving legal services.
(c) For purposes of [this section], "nonlegal services" shall mean those services
that lawyers may lawfully provide and that are not prohibited as an
unauthorized practice of law when provided by a nonlawyer.
N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-106 (2001).
157. See id. 1-106(c).
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could provide investment or insurance advice; a nonlawyer with
similar licenses could provide the same services. The goal of the
rule is to require clarity with respect to services provided. The rule
applies to both legal and nonlegal services when the nonlegal
services are not distinct from the legal services.'58 The rule applies
when a person who receives the nonlegal services could reasonably
believe that they "are the subject of an attorney-client
relationship."'' 9 The rule applies to a lawyer or firm that is "an
owner, controlling party or agent of, or that is otherwise affiliated
with" an entity the lawyer knows is providing nonlegal services to a
person if the client could reasonably believe that the nonlegal
services are a subject of the attorney-client relationship.'o The
lawyer or law firm bears the burden of communicating to clients
that the nonlegal services are not part of the attorney-client
relationship; the rule presumes that the client receiving nonlegal
services believes they are a part of the attorney-client relationship
unless the lawyer advises the client in writing that the nonlegal
services do not enjoy the protection of the attorney-client
privilege.'6'
DR 1-106 reinforces the notion that a nonlawyer should not
influence the professional judgment of a lawyer. A lawyer or law
firm is not permitted to allow any nonlawyer providing nonlegal
services "to direct or regulate the professional judgment of the
lawyer or law firm."'62 While maintaining the professional integrity
of the legal profession is important, this part of the rule on
professionalism ignores a fundamental reality of MDPs: lawyers
and nonlawyers will be working together under any scheme.
Therefore, while DR 1-106 effectively requires that a lawyer's
professional judgment not be impeded, it should expand to focus
on the professional judgment of the other professions, such as
accounting. By working together with accountants, rather than in
isolation, lawyers and other professionals can craft joint ethical
guidelines that mutually state the goals of their collective efforts
158. See id. 1-106(a)(1).
159. See id. 1-106(a)(2).
160. See id. 1-106(a)(3).
161. See id. 1-106(a)(4).
162. See id. 1-106(b).
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while protecting client interests. Instead of having two separate
ethical codes, one universal set of guidelines should be drafted to
apply to both lawyers and nonlawyers (such as accountants)
working in an MDP environment. These guidelines should outline
the joint responsibilities of MDP lawyers and nonlawyers, while
providing guidance on issues such as attorney-client privilege and
confidentiality/disclosure. If, when entering the relationship, the
lawyer and the accountant know each other's responsibilities, and
the client understands the overall obligations of the MDP firm, the
client will receive a higher quality of defined services.
It is somewhat surprising that New York did not attempt to
distinguish between lawyers providing transactional services and
those providing advocacy services, in light of the Committee's
recognition of the distinctions between various kinds of lawyers.
For example, New York's Special Committee made note of
increased specialization in the legal profession.'6 s The Special
Committee observed that lawyers in larger law firms who
predominantly served business clients developed competence in
particular areas of the law to better serve corporate clientele.'" It
is striking that the Special Committee observed that, at one time,
the profession's ethical rules forbade lawyers to hold themselves
out as specialists except in patent, trademark, or admiralty law.
Under the current formulation, the ABA Standing Committee on
Specialization has promulgated standards for some twenty-four
specialties.165 It would seem logical, therefore, given that the
Special Committee recognized the value of segmenting lawyers by
specialization, that it would consider rules distinguishing between
transactional and litigation services. '66 However, no such effort was
163. Preserving Core Values, supra note 151, at 15 (noting that, over time, an
"increase[ed] premium was put on specialization to maintain competence and to
keep abreast of subject matter.").
164. Id. at 16.
165. Id.
166. This Note does not address the broader issue of whether different ethical
standards should apply to litigators and transactional attorneys. While such a
framework with two separate ethical standards may be desirable and eliminate
many seemingly contradictory statements in the ethical rules, this Note simply
advocates that having different standards would facilitate the development of
MDPs.
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made in these revised New York rules. This is a potential
weakness in the New York approach.
This section of the rule dealing with permissible lawyer-
nonlawyer partnerships should be commended, however, for ,
placing the onus of establishing the nonexistence of the attorney-
client relationship on the attorney member of the MDP.167 Even
for a sophisticated client," this rule represents a change from the
way legal services have been provided. It is important for the
lawyer to educate the client on the new MDP structure.
DR 1-107 permits lawyers to form relationships with
nonlawyers to provide legal and non-legal services to clients on a
systematic and continuing basis, provided that the nonlawyers do
not own, control, supervise, or manage, directly or indirectly, in
whole or in part, the practice of law by the lawyer or law firm. 169
167. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
169. Specifically, DR 1-107 reads:
Contractual Relationship Between Lawyers and Nonlegal Professionals
(a) The practice of law has an essential tradition of complete independence and
uncompromised loyalty to those it serves. Recognizing this tradition, clients of
lawyers practicing in New York State are guaranteed "independent professional
judgment and undivided loyalty uncompromised by conflicts of interest."
Indeed, these guarantees represent the very foundation of the profession and
allow and foster its continued role as a protector of the system of law.
Therefore, a lawyer must remain completely responsible for his or her own
independent professional judgment, maintain the confidences and secrets of
clients, preserve funds of clients and third parties in his or her control, and
otherwise comply with the legal and ethical principles governing lawyers in New
York State.
Multi-disciplinary practice between lawyers and nonlawyers is incompatible
with the core values of the legal profession and therefore, a strict division
between services provided by lawyers and those provided by nonlawyers is
essential to protect those values. However, a lawyer or law firm may enter into
and maintain a contractual relationship with a nonlegal professional or nonlegal
professional service firm for the purpose of offering to the public, on a
systematic and continuing basis, legal services performed by the lawyer or law
firm, as well as other nonlegal professional services,.., provided that:
1. The profession of the nonlegal professional or nonlegal professional
service firm is included in a list jointly established and maintained by the
Appellate Divisions ....
2. The lawyer or law firm neither grants to the nonlegal professional or
nonlegal professional service firm, nor permits such person or firm to obtain,
hold or exercise, directly or indirectly, any ownership or investment interest in,
or managerial or supervisory right, power or position in connection with the
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The rule begins with a lengthy preamble about the value of
lawyers' maintaining their independent professional judgment.70
Clients of lawyers practicing in New York are guaranteed
"professional judgment and undivided loyalty uncompromised by
conflicts of interest.' 71 A lawyer, therefore, must remain
completely responsible for his or her professional judgment. The
New York preamble then contains a statement that comments
practice of law by the lawyer or law firm, nor ... shares legal fees with a
nonlawyer or receives or gives any monetary or other tangible benefit for giving
or receiving a referral; and
3. The fact that the contractual relationship exists is disclosed by the
lawyer or law firm to any client of the lawyer or law firm before the client is
referred to the nonlegal professional service firm, or to any client of the
nonlegal professional service firm before that client receives legal services from
the lawyer or law firm; and the client has given informed written consent and
has been provided with a copy of the "Statement of Client's Rights [i]n
Cooperative Business Arrangements"....
(b) For [these purposes]:
(1) Each profession on the list maintained pursuant to a joint rule of the
Appellate Divisions shall have been designated sua sponte, or approved by the
Appellate Divisions upon application of a member of a nonlegal profession or
nonlegal professional service firm, upon a determination that the profession is
composed of individuals who, with respect to their profession:
(a) have been awarded a Bachelor's Degree or its equivalent from an
accredited college or university;
(b) are licensed to practice the profession by an agency of the State of
New York or the United States Government; and
(c) are required under penalty of suspension or revocation of license to
adhere to a code of ethical conduct that is reasonably comparable to that of the
legal profession.
(2) The term "ownership or investment interest" shall mean any such
interest in any form of debt or equity, and shall include any interest commonly
considered to be an interest accruing to or enjoyed by an owner or investor.
(c) [These rules] shall not apply to relationships consisting solely of reciprocal
referral agreements or understandings between a lawyer or law firm and a
nonlegal professional or nonlegal professional service firm.
(d) [A] lawyer or law firm may allocate costs and expenses with a nonlegal
professional or nonlegal professional service firm pursuant to a contractual
relationship.., provided the allocation reasonably reflects only the costs and
expenses incurred or expected to be incurred by each.
N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-107 (2001).
170. Id. 1-107(A). It is interesting to note that these value statements are
included in the rule and not offered as part of the comments as is customary in
other jurisdictions.
171. Id.
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upon the challenges presented by MDPs: "Multi-disciplinary
practice between lawyers and nonlawyers is incompatible with the
core values of the legal profession and... a strict division between
services provided by lawyers and... nonlawyers is essential to
protect those values." '72 A lawyer or a law firm may, however,
enter into a contractual relationship with nonlegal professionals or
nonlegal professional firms to provide joint services to the public. '73
This part of the rule suggests that, by working with
nonlawyers, a lawyer will be less likely to maintain independent
professional judgment."'7 However, the statement ignores the fact
that today many lawyers practice in environments where they are
supervised by nonlawyers. As the Special Committee observed,
"[t]he in-house lawyer's role came to be seen in many companies as
keeping the corporation free of legal trouble rather than getting
the client out of trouble."'75 If in-house counsel can function with
success and independence while not compromising ethics rules, it
seems logical to take the position that independence would not be
compromised in an MDP setting. In fact, an MDP firm, with
lawyers held accountable for the actions of other partners, should
be less likely to compromise professional ethics. While New York
may be the first state to allow MDPs in a limited form, other states,
in an effort to attract MDPs to their own jurisdiction, may craft
more permissive MDP regulations.
Flowing throughout New York's new guidelines is an
undercurrent emphasizing the need for independent professional
judgment. However, as Professor Munneke argues, lawyers have
successfully continued to practice with independent professional
judgment in environments where there would appear to be an
inherent conflict of interest clouding a lawyer's professional
judgment.7 Lawyers already work in a number of settings where
172 Id.
173. Id.
174. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
175. Preserving Core Values, supra note 151, at 89; see also Terry, supra note
13, at 928 (defusing the argument that MDPs will be harmful because of third
party influence by pointing out that, despite the risk, U.S. regulators trust
corporate counsel to comply with ethical obligations despite third-party
pressure).
176. For example, many firms today have in-house counsel. While the in-
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nonlawyers exercise tremendous influence over the way the
lawyers practice law and the decisions the lawyers make.' Even
private practitioners who represent a single client, as well as
lawyers working for any group, such as a provider of legal service
programs for the indigent, are often accountable to a nonlawyer
board of directors.
1 78
Under the New York rule, three circumstances are required
for a contractual relationship with nonlawyers. First, the
profession of the nonlegal professionals or firms must be one that
is included on a list maintained by the New York Appellate
Division.'79 A profession may be added to the list through
application to the Appellate Divisions.' In order to qualify, the
profession must be composed of individuals who earn at least a
bachelor's degree or its equivalent from an accredited college or
university;'8' are licensed to practice the profession by an agency of
house counsel are expected to offer independent legal advice, the fact remains
that their supervisors and those ultimately responsible for the welfare of the
corporation, i.e., the CEO and board of directors, have the ability to exert direct
and indirect pressure on in-house counsel.
177. See Gary A. Munneke, Lawyers, Accountants, and the Battle to Own
Professional Services, 20 PACE L. REV. 73, 90 (1999).
17& See id. Professor Munneke observes that the American legal system has
been able to accommodate oversight by nonlawyers "where expediency or the
Constitution seem[s] to make it feasible." Id. It would seem, given the success in
these areas, that opponents of MDPs have some other motivation for continuing
the ban. Professor Munneke suggests that the primary motivation for the
continued prohibition is "economic protectionism, rather than ethical probity."
Id; see also Charles W. Wolfram, The ABA and MDPs: Context, History, and
Process, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1625, 1648 (2000) (discussing how a law student
leaving a social work career and working with his spouse, also a social worker, to
provide divorce law and marriage counseling services would violate the ban
against MDPs in almost every jurisdiction except the District of Columbia);
Louise G. Trubek & Jennifer J. Farnham, Social Justice Collaboratives:
Multidisciplinary Practices for People, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 227, 271 (2000)
(arguing that social justice concerns-the ability of lawyers to work with social
service providers -should be taken into consideration when debating the MDP
issue and evaluating its costs and benefits for potential clients).
179. N.Y. Code of Prof'l Responsibility DR 1-107(A) (2001).
180. Id. 1-107(B)(1).
181. Id. 1-107(B)(1)(a).
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the State of New York or the United States Government;. 2 and are
subject to an ethical code of conduct, similar to that of the legal
profession, that allows for a license to be revoked or suspended for
professional misconduct.'83 Second, the nonlegal professionals are
not permitted to exercise control over the law firm or receive a
portion of the profits or share in the legal fees earned by the lawyer
or law firm." Third, the contractual relationship between the
lawyer or law firm and the nonlegal professional must be disclosed
before a client is referred to the nonlegal professional or to the
lawyer or law firm.'85 Essentially, disclosure is required before
either party may refer a client to the other party. The client must
then give informed written consent and receive a copy of "Client's
Rights in Cooperative Business Arrangements."'86
New York's requirement of a contractual relationship between
lawyers and nonlawyers could actually serve to make lawyers less
accountable for their nonlawyer partners. In a contractual setting,
one can see a nonlawyer partner's liability being limited to
damages for breach of contract. If nonlawyers were partners in the
MDP enterprise, their liability would be increased. As the Special
Committee observed, "[w]hen needs arise, lawyers are quite
capable" of working effectively with professionals and
recommending that their clients engage the services of particular
accountants, financial advisors, investment bankers, engineers,
brokers, social workers, and other professionals."8  By confining
this relationship to one of contract rather than one of agency or
partnership law, New York places the interests of MDP member
professionals above the interests of clients. The core values of
lawyer independence would be better preserved if these
relationships were in the open and regulated as opposed to their
current status where they are covertly structured to avoid existing






187. Preserving Core Values, supra note 151, at 98.
188. Id. at 101 (observing that "there is anecdotal evidence that law firms
throughout the country continue to own and operate ancillary business
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permitted to share fees (and thus retain liability for their share of
the fees), '89 one can argue that they would be more likely to police
the actions of their nonlawyer partners. If lawyers were partners
with these nonlawyer professionals, their accountability for the
work of these professionals would increase, not decrease as the
New York rules fear.
The contractual relationship between the lawyer and
nonlawyer must be disclosed to the client and the client must sign a
consent agreement.9 ° The client is advised of the following four
items. First, the client is guaranteed "the independent professional
judgment and undivided loyalty of the lawyer"'' and advised that
the lawyer's business relationship with a nonlegal professional may
not diminish these rights.92 Second, the client is advised that
confidences and secrets disclosed by the client to the lawyer are
protected by attorney-client privilege. The lawyer may not disclose
these confidences as part of the referral to a nonlawyer without a
separate written consent of the client.'93 Third, the protections
afforded to the client by the attorney-client privilege might not
carry over to dealings between the client and the nonlegal service
provider; information that would be protected, if given to the
lawyer by the client, might not be so protected when disclosed by
the client to a nonlegal service provider; and under some
circumstances, the nonlegal service provider may be required to
make disclosure to a government agency."' Fourth, even when the
lawyer refers a client to a nonlawyer, the lawyer's obligation to
safeguard client funds in his or her possession continues.'" Finally,
the client is advised of his or her rights to consult an independent
subsidiaries within the existing legal and ethical framework governing lawyers.").
189. See, e.g., Uniform Partnership Act § 306(a) (1994) ("Except as otherwise
provided.., all partners are liable jointly and severally for all obligations of the
partnership unless otherwise agreed by the claimant or provided by law.").
Lawyers in an MDP would have a vested interest in monitoring the actions of
their accountant colleagues to avoid liability.
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lawyer or third party before signing.'96
While the consent agreement raises some critical issues, it
provides an innovative choice for clients on whether they want to
engage an MDP firm. The SEC may never permit one firm to
provide auditing and legal services to the same client unless
information known to the lawyers is legally attributable to the
auditors.7 If given a choice, only clients that want auditing and
legal services from the same firm will consent to "direct...
uninhibited communication between auditors and lawyers about
information that is material to the audit."'98 New York's consent
agreement could even be viewed as an additional safeguard for
investors. Consent would be attractive to those who "want to
assure investors, regulators and third parties that they have
enhanced procedures for detection and prevention of fraud and
other illegal acts."'99
Under the New York consent agreement, it is unclear what
impact the SEC's disclosure requirements would have on MDPs.
Given that the MDP relationship is limited to one of contract, one
can assume the SEC's disclosure requirements would have no
additional impact on lawyers and would remain the responsibility
of accountants. However, New York's consent agreement does
provide clients with a critical choice: those wishing to waive their
possible rights can choose an MDP firm, while those not wishing to
196. Id.
197. See Richard W. Painter, Lawyers' Rules, Auditors' Rules and the
Psychology of Concealment, 84 MINN. L. REv. 1399, 1430 (2000) (observing that
"[w]hile liability concerns might necessitate lawyer-auditor communication
within a multidisciplinary firm, this scheme is not mandatory for clients."); see
also Carol A. Needham, Permitting Lawyers to Participate in Multidisciplinary
Practices: Business As Usual or the End of the Profession As We Know It?, 84
MINN. L. REv. 1315, 1318 (2000) (noting that the SEC has already declared that
it considers an auditor's independence to be impaired if the auditor's firm also
provides legal advice to a client).
198. Painter, supra note 197.
199. Id. at 1430-31. Contra Lawrence J. Fox, Con: MDPs and Legal Ethics:
Big 5 Lay Siege upon Rule 5.4, OR. ST. B. BULL., July 2000, at 15, 23 (arguing that
a lawyer's duty of confidentiality cannot be waived for the benefit of that lawyer
and, even if it could be, a prospective waiver-a waiver granted before engaging
the services of the lawyer-would be void because, by definition, it could never
be "knowing and intelligent").
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waive their rights can receive legal and accounting services from
two independent firms.
III. SOLUTIONS AND CURRENT ISSUES
If New York's MDP solution is not the most effective,
alternatives are available. Professor Wu suggests that there are
alternatives outside the MDP form that would avoid its negative
consequences.2' One such solution suggests that law firms
organize themselves in "client teams" to meet the more diversified
needs of particular clients." ' Under this approach, law firms would
build a "strategic client team" around an individual client. 2 The
team, formed early in the provision of services to the client, would
contain speciality lawyers (who are trained in financial matters,
such as accounting) key to the client's needs. 3 This would result in
improved client service throught the coordination of expertise and
a more satisfying environment for lawyers with additional training
to practice.2 This would be a change from the traditional
organization of a firm around practice groups.0" While this
approach may serve the end of providing high-quality service to
clients, Wu does not offer solutions on how fee sharing and
nonlawyer partners, the most contentious aspects of the MDP
debate, would be addressed. Arguably, these client teams would
face many of the same hurdles as MDPs without providing any
discernible advantages.
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Responsibility apply
uniformly to all types of practicing lawyers, both litigators and
transactional attorneys. Another proposed solution for the MDP
issue is to develop a revised Rule 5.4 that treats different practices
of law differently.2 6 Lawyers and accountants serve different roles
200. Wu, supra note 59, at 574-75.





206. See generally Marc N. Biamonte, Note, Multidisciplinary Practices: Must a
Change to Model Rule 5.4 Apply to All Law Firms Uniformly?, 42 B.C. L. REv.
1161 (2001). The author proposes that Rule 5.4 of the Model Rules of
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for their clients.2" As the United States Supreme Court explained
in United States v. Arthur Young & Co.,208 an attorney's role is to be
"a loyal representative whose duty it is to present the client's case
in the most favorable possible light."2' 9 The Court observed that,
by certifying a corporation's public financial reports, an
independent certified public accountant assumes a public
responsibility and "performs a different role": 211 the accountant
that makes this certification owes ultimate allegiance, not to a
client, but to the corporation's creditors and stockholders, as well
as to the investing public.211 This responsibility to function as a
"public watchdog" mandates that the accountant maintain "total
independence from the client at all times and requires complete
fidelity to the public trust.,
21 2
I argue, however, that the Supreme Court's characterization of
the different roles played by lawyers and accountants is incorrect,
or at least that the roles are different today than at the time of the
Supreme Court's decision. Professor Kostant observes that "[iun
practice, corporate lawyers perform transactional work, not
litigation. 2 1'  Today, argues Kostant, "[t]he distinction between a
lawyer's duties to the corporate 'client' on one hand and an
accountant's duties to 'creditors, shareholders.., and the investing
public' . . . is in fact much less clear., 21 1 One solution to this
fundamental change in the role of transactional attorneys is to
develop a different set of ethical guidelines to reflect the evolution
of the transactional lawyer's role in corporate America."5
Professional Conduct be changed to allow only small firms to participate in
MDPs. Id. at 1188. He also argues that such a change would greatly benefit those
firms and their clients while causing little, if any, threat to the independent
professional judgment of lawyers, and recommends that the bar explore such
"creative and unique" solutions to the MDP debate before "closing the book on
the issue." Id. at 1190-94.
207. See Kostant, supra note 134, at 59.
208. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
209. Id. at 817.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 817-18.
212. Id. at 818.
213. Kostant, supra note 134, at 59-60.
214. Id.
215. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Problem Solver and
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MDP opponents argue that legal ethics rules will need to
undergo too great a revision to accommodate multidisciplinary
practice."6 One solution is a radical revision. Instead of debating a
single rule for both transactional attorneys and litigators,"7 the
ABA should recognize that "[o]utside the litigation practice, the
line between what is and what is not the practice of law has become
even more blurred.
218
While a move in the right direction, New York's rule does not
go far enough to make MDPs a viable alternative for American
firms. However, shortly after New York became one of the first
states of accept limited MDPs, the political environment changed
when Enron Corporation ("Enron") became the largest company
in United States history to file bankruptcy.
A. The Story of Enron Corporation
"Opponents of letting accounting firms into the U.S. legal
business have a new battle cry: Remember Enron."2 '9 As do all
Third-Party Neutral: Creativity and Non-Partisanship in Lawyering, 72 TEMP. L.
REv. 785, 808 (1999) (arguing that current rules of legal ethics do not recognize
the role of the "lawyer as mediator, arbitrator,.., consensus building facilitator,
neutral evaluator, and dispute systems designer.").
216. See, e.g., Earl H. Munson, The Case Against MDPs, 74 Wis. LAw., Apr.
2001, at 22, 54 (observing that "ft]he rules of professional conduct for attorneys
which express the core values of our profession would have to be modified-
some of us might say nullified-to accommodate MDPs.").
217. See, e.g., Christopher L. Noble, Multidisciplinary Practice: A Construction
Law Perspective, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 413, 423 (2000) (proposing ethics rules
that would distinguish between a transactional lawyer's solicitor-like services and
the barrister-like services of the trial lawyer). Further, in Tia Breakley, Note,
Multidisciplinary Practices: Lawyers & Accountants Under One Roof?, 2000
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 275, 289, the author points out differences between the
motivations of managing partners in law firms and accounting firms and suggests
that a lawyer managing partner takes into consideration, as a factor, the
probability of success. Probability of success, i.e., winning or losing, has greater
relevance in a litigation context. Such a motivation is much less striking in the
decision to pursue transactional matters.
218. Munneke, supra note 177, at 76.
219. Geanne Rosenberg, Scandal Seen As Blow to Outlook for MDP, NAT'L
L.J., Jan. 21, 2002, at Al; see also Robert L. Bartley, WALL ST. J., Thinking
Things Over: Enron: First, Apply the Law, Feb. 11, 2002, at A23 (observing that
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publicly traded companies in the United States, Enron engaged an
outside auditor to scrutinize its annual financial data.2 Enron, one
of the nation's largest corporations, filed for bankruptcy-court
protection on December 2, 2001, "following a loss of investor
confidence after the company issued several earnings restatements
dating back to 1997. " "22 Enron is of special interest to this
discussion because of the considerable media attention it
received,222 for the size of its bankruptcy, the actions of the key
"Enron" is now "the latest battle cry of a host of agendas-passing campaign
finance reform, retreating before the tort-liability bar, and extolling other...
'reforms' that may or may not be relevant to the giant bankruptcy.").
220. See David S. Hilzenrath, After Enron, New Doubts About Auditors,
WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2001, at Al (discussing how Enron became the largest
bankruptcy in U.S. history).
221. Tom Hamburger et al., Staff Saw Document Shredding at Enron, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 22, 2002, at A3 (discussing the dismissal of Arthur Andersen's David
Duncan for allegedly overseeing the destruction of Enron documents); see
Robert L. Bartley, WALL ST. J., Thinking Things Over: Enron: First, Apply the
Law, Feb. 11, 2002, at A23. Enron originally reported earnings of $105 million in
1997, $703 million in 1998, $893 million in 1999, and $979 million in 2000. Id.
After "stripping out the sham transactions," Enron restated its earnings for the
previous four years as follows: $77 million in 1997, $570 million in 1998, $645
million in 1999, and $880 million in 2000. Id. Before its first revelations of
problems on October 16, 2001, Enron's share price had fallen from $83.12 to
$33.17 at the close of the previous year. Id. In September 2000 the price had
briefly touched $90.00, compared to year-end quotes of $44.38 in 1999, $28.59 in
1998, and $20.78 in 1997. Id. After the restatements of earnings, the share price
crashed to $13.90 by the end of October 2001; it stood at 26 cents at the end of
November. Id. Enron filed for bankruptcy in December. Id.
222. Enron's bankruptcy proved pervasive enough to attract the attention of
many publications that traditionally do not report on complex financial matters.
See, e.g., Steve Rushin, It's a Bear Out There, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 5,
2002, 15, 15 (reporting the "rebranding" of the Houston Astros Enron Field to
Minute Maid Park following the Enron bankruptcy); see also Laura Washington,
Protecting Your Own 401(k), ESSENCE, July 2002, at 139, 139 (reporting
"[e]xperts emphasize that the 401(k) is still the best retirement-savings vehicle
available to the American worker" even after Enron); Mark Hamstra,
Supermarkets Need to Keep Their Accounting Simple, SUPERMARKET NEWS, July
29, 2002, at 8, 8 (stating, in an article about supermarket accounting, that "buying
and selling bananas and other grocery products shouldn't be as complicated as
Enron's business model."); Kayleen Schaefer, Nike Uses "Doctrine of
Conservatism," FOOTWEAR NEWS, July 8, 2002, at 15, 15 (reporting Nike CEO
Phil Knight's statement that Nike is culturally different from Enron and other
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players, and the role of its auditors. 3 Congress is also conducting
hearings on the matter.22 ' Through Enron's 401(k) retirement plan,
its employees elected to put much of their savings in the
corporation's shares, based on reports from Enron executives that
the company had positive growth potential.2' However, around
the time Enron disclosed serious financial problems, the company
froze the assets in the plan. 6 Enron's 401(k) plan had $2.1 billion
in assets, more than half invested in Enron shares, at the end of
2000; less than a year later, the stock had lost ninety-four percent
of its value. 7
Of particular interest to a discussion of MDPs is the role of
companies engaged in accounting scandals); Rising Insurance Rates Require
Renewed Vigilance, HOTELS, May 1, 2002, at 12, 12 (listing the Enron bankruptcy
as one of several factors causing hotel insurance costs to rise as much as 15
percent to 50 percent); Joe Truini, More Enron Fallout; Deal with Conn. WTE
Group Goes Sour, WASTE NEWS, Apr. 29, 2002, at 4, 4 (discussing a waste
management authority's severe financial problems as a result of Enron's
collapse); Matthew Benz, Can Top Media/Music Marriages Be Saved?,
BILLBOARD, Apr. 27, 2002, at 1, 1 (discussing the impact of the Enron
bankruptcy on the media industry); Japan's Snow Brand Foods Does an Enron:
Meat Mislabeling Scandal Brings It Down, QUICK FROZEN FOODS
INTERNATIONAL, Apr. 1, 2002, at 54, 54 (discussing the "Enron" of the Japanese
food industry, the bankruptcy of meat packer Snow Brand Foods (SBF)); Jesse
Jackson and Labor Union Seek $ 100 Million for Ex-Enron Workers, JET, Mar. 4,
2002, at 6, 6 (discussing Rev. Jesse Jackson and the AFL-CIO's filing of a motion
in U.S. bankruptcy court on behalf of laid-off Enron employees seeking $ 100
million in severance payments for former workers).
223. This Note will not attempt to provide an in-depth analysis of Enron, its
bankruptcy, or the fate of its auditor, Arthur Andersen. Furthermore, the author
makes no judgments about the conduct of Enron Corporation executives, board
members, or employees, or of its auditor. Rather, Enron will be briefly discussed
to determine its potential impact on the MDP debate and its relationship to the
rationales offered by MDP opponents and proponents.
224. See Susan Pulliam, WorldCom Is Denounced at Hearing: Congressmen
Say Executives Mismanaged Company; Grubman Draws Criticism, WALL ST. J.,
July 9, 2002, at A3.
225. See Richard A. Oppel Jr., Employees' Retirement Plan Is a Victim As
Enron Tumbles, NY TIMES, Nov. 22, 2001, available at
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Enron's former auditor, the Big Five accounting firm Arthur
Andersen, now at the center of this controversy. Enron's
relationship with Arthur Andersen began more than a decade ago
when Andersen came to view Enron as a "key building block" in
its plan to expand a business of providing internal auditing services
along with its traditional external auditing functions.2' In early
negotiations with a committee of Enron's creditors, Andersen
extended a litigation settlement offer of between $700 million and
$800 million.229
The controversy surrounding Andersen's actions before the
collapse of Enron "seems to me a complete vindication of
everything we wrote in the year 2000," says Robert MacCrate, a
Sullivan & Cromwell senior counsel, referring to a report issued by
the New York State Bar Association's Special Committee on the
Law Governing Firm Structure and Operation.23 MacCrate says
that the Enron scandal, including Arthur Andersen's role as both
accountant and consultant, illustrates the type of conflict lawyers
could face if their practice were based in a Big Five accounting
228. See Alexi Barrionuevo, Questioning the Books: Court Documents Show
Andersen's Ties with Enron Were Growing in Early '90s, WALL. ST. J., Feb. 26,
2002, at A6 (noting Andersen's original proposal to take over Enron's internal
auditing function included a five-year guaranteed contract; for Andersen, $18
million in net fees and "value billing opportunities" of as many as 44,440
guaranteed consulting hours; and a potential savings of $12 million for Enron);
see also Steve Liesman et al., Dirty Books? Accounting Debacles Spark Calls for
Change: Here's the Rundown, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2002, at Al (noting that the
$27 million of internal auditing work that Andersen did for Enron in 2000
exceeded the "outside" auditing fees by $2 million).
229. See Mitchell Pacelle et al., Andersen Makes Offer to Enron Creditors
Panel, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 2002, at A3 (reporting that Andersen might be able
to pay as much as $1 billion in a settlement, with funds drawn from insurance, the
firm's self-insurance pool, and the company's earnings over the next few years);
see also David S. Hilzenrath, Andersen Focuses on Ability to Pay; Firm in Talks to
Settle Lawsuit, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 2002, at E4 ("Arthur Andersen's efforts to
settle lawsuits with Enron [Corporation] shareholders have focused on how much
money Andersen can afford to pay without going out of business.. ").
230. See Rosenberg, supra note 219; see also Patrick A. Tuite, Enron Shows
What Problems Might Face MDPs, CHI. LAw., Mar. 2002, at 13, 13 (discussing
how the relationship between Enron and Andersen illustrates the potential for
conflicts of interest among MDPs, and arguing ethics rules should not be changed
to permit lawyers and accountants to work together).
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B. The Impact of Enron Corporation on the MDP Debate
Commentators have discussed the Enron collapse and many
view it and the alleged role of its auditors as the end of the MDP
debate.232 Arthur Andersen's lucrative consulting for Enron may
have created an irreconcilable conflict of interest, with the desire to
retain the profitable consulting work providing a strong financial
disincentive for Andersen to meet its public-disclosure
obligations. 3 If such conflicts can exist within accounting firms
that do not provide legal services to the public, the argument
continues, "there can no longer be any serious question that
allowing lawyers to practice [together with accountants, with their




MDP opponents further argue Enron reinforces the notion
that accountants should not be supervising a law firm business, in
part, because they do not have a code of professional conduct that
is as strict as the one followed by lawyers. 5  If they did, the
argument continues, Enron would not have happened. In order for
MDPs and their related ethical obligations to be effective, the legal
231. See Rosenberg, supra note 219.
232. See Steven C. Krane, Let Lawyers Practice Law, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 28, 2002,
at A16 (observing that, according to published reports, Enron paid Arthur
Andersen tens of millions of dollars for consulting work, in addition to the tens of
millions of dollars Andersen earned for its auditing of Enron); see also Liesman
et al., supra note 228 (noting fees paid by Enron to Arthur Andersen for internal
and external auditing work).
233. See Krane, supra note 232.
234. See id. (noting that in February 2002 the American Bar Association's
House of Delegates was to consider the New York State Bar Association's
proposal to amend the Model Rules of Professional Conduct to include
provisions corresponding to those that recently had been added to New York's
rules of attorney ethics).
235. See Brenda Sandburg, Enron Mess Gives a Boost to MDP Foes,
RECORDER, Jan. 23, 2002, at 1, 1 (noting that the controversy over Arthur
Andersen's handling of Enron's financial records many not only harm the
accounting firm's reputation, but also serve as a "fatal blow to a marriage
between the accounting industry and [the] legal profession.").
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profession and the accounting profession must develop
collaboratively a set of ethical standards and guidelines. New York
failed to take this step promulgating one set of standards for all
types of lawyers. Any pressure that accountant-supervisors could
place on lawyer-subordinates could be averted if both were
operating under a uniform ethical structure. 6
I disagree with MDP opponents that Enron ends the MDP
debate. I argue that Enron demonstrates the need for MDPs. In
the aftermath of Enron, the SEC and others have proposed
revisions to existing rules and regulations to improve the
effectiveness and reliability of independent audits.z" The SEC may
now welcome increased disclosure requirements that would follow
in an MDP. As one commentator suggests, "transactional
attorneys could improve the quality of audits and ensure that more
of the information necessary for good corporate governance and
compliance with the law would reach corporate audit
committees.""8  After all, "[a]s a practical matter, after serious
236. See Leslie Kiefer Amann, Letter to the Editor, Same Ethical Rules Must
Apply, TEX. LAW., Feb. 4, 2002, at 38, (observing that "[i]f the same ethical rules
apply notwithstanding whether the name on the door is that of an attorney or an
accountant," many of the concerns raised by MDP critics would effectively be
addressed).
237. See, e.g., Michael Schroeder, Lawmakers Plan More Financial Oversight,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 2002, at A3 (discussing proposed legislation that would
create a private board to regulate the accounting industry and would establish
new restrictions against auditors' offering certain consulting services to their
corporate audit clients); David S. Hilzenrath, SEC Seeks Reform of Auditor
Controls; Battered Enron Fires Accounting Firm, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2002, at
Al (calling the SEC's proposal for an accounting oversight board that would be
funded by the private sector, but kept separate from the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, the "most significant change in the way
accountants are regulated since the Great Depression."); Michael Schroeder,
SEC Proposes Accounting Disciplinary Body, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2002, at C1
(discussing the plans of SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt for a series of reforms in the
accounting industry, including new types of oversight and new rules mandating
expanded corporate disclosures).
238. Peter C. Kostant, Breeding Better Watchdogs: Multidisciplinary
Partnerships in Corporate Legal Practice, 84 MINN. L. REv. 1213, 1219-20 (2000)
(arguing that transactional lawyers working in an MDP setting may be in a better
position than those in a traditional law firm to further the SEC's goals of full
disclosure, effective monitoring by corporate audit committees, and the
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accounting scandals, corporations routinely bring in law firms to
work closely with new accounting firms to help solve these
problems." '239 By involving lawyers from the beginning of the
transaction rather than after trouble surfaces, corporate managers
and accountants could be better informed about liability risks. The
organized bar should take care to frame the Enron issue in the
following terms: Enron demonstrates why the independent
auditors need liability-conscious lawyers as partners. By allowing
lawyers and accountants to work together in an MDP from the
onset, these professionals can provide the highest level of service
and improve compliance with existing laws and regulations.
Accountants involved in audits made cognizant of potential
liability by their lawyer partners may provide the the best
insurance against another Enron.
CONCLUSION
For jurisdictions that follow New York and amend their ethics
rules to permit MDPs, I offer the following four recommendations.
First, future MDP rules should include consent agreements as
provided for in New York.' ° This will grant access to MDPs for
those clients desiring the benefits of a streamlined firm of
interrelated professionals. Under this scheme, the traditional
relationship between lawyers and nonlawyers will be preserved for
those who may find it in their best interest to engage independent
firms. Furthermore, the SEC may be more willing to sanction
lawyers' and accountants' working together if the relationship is
disclosed to clients.2"' Finally, while sophisticated clients may be in
a position to protect themselves from any conflict, '2 less
sophisticated clients will be alerted to the relationship in order to
put them on notice. Such a disclosure requirement would do
considerably more to protect clients than does the existing
American scheme, wherein lawyers work inside accounting firms
avoidance of both "fraud and the chicanery of 'earnings management"').
239. Id. at 1220.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 190-96.
241. See supra text accompanying note 197.
242. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
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without any disclosure about possible conflicts to the clients.
Second, jurisdictions should consider promulgating separate
ethics guidelines for transactional lawyers243 in an MDP setting.
Ideally, these separate ethical guidelines should be developed with
accountants and other professionals, rather than in isolation.
While New York did not take this approach, the bar is capable of
recognizing a change in the legal landscape and amending ethics
rules to respond to that change. For example, while the bar did not
recognize specialization at one time, it now embraces the
concept.2" The legal landscape is changing. 5  No longer are
lawyers only advocates; they now serve as key advisors, aiding in
structuring increasingly complex business transactions. It is time
ethics rules reflect this change.
Third, jurisdictions should avoid New York's approach of
rejecting true MDPs in favor of contractual relationships."6 This
contractual relationship will decrease, rather than increase,
accountability among professionals. While members of a
partnership are jointly and severally liable for the liabilities of the
partnership, '7 it is unclear how liability would be apportioned
under the New York rule. For example, an accountant and lawyer
could be liable to each other only for breach of contract damages,
243. See Lisa Bernstein, The Silicon Valley Lawyer As Transaction Cost
Engineer?, 74 OR. L. REv. 239, 240 (1995) (observing that transactional lawyers
in Silicon Valley play several different roles including counseling, dealmaking,
matchmaking, gatekeeping, and proselytizing) (citations omitted); Frank B.
Cross, The First Thing We Do, Let's Kill All the Economists: An Empirical
Evaluation of the Effect of Lawyers on the United States Economy and Political
System, 70 TEx. L. REv. 645, 657 (1992) (stating that lawyers appear to serve
more generally as "system integrators," individuals skilled at putting deals
together while minimizing risks and costs of undertaking the transaction); see also
supra text accompanying note 236. Some commentators argue that not even law
schools recognize the need to distinguish between litigators and transactional
attorneys. See, e.g., Debra Pogrund Stark, See Jane Graduate. Why Can't Jane
Negotiate a Business Transaction?, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 477, 478-83 (1999)
(criticizing law schools and professors for failing to spend adequate time on
transactional matters).
244. See supra text accompanying note 163.
245. See supra text accompanying note 67.
246. See supra text accompanying note 186.
247. See supra text accompanying note 189.
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rather than the full extent of liability that they would be liable for
under partnership law. This contractual relationship developed by
New York will actually frustrate the goal of having lawyers and
nonlawyers share liability equally: it decreases accountability of
MDP professionals. To make an MDP function properly, other
jurisdictions should avoid this scheme and permit lawyer and
nonlawyer professionals to share equally in the liability of the
enterprise.
Fourth, as a corollary to the third recommendation,
jurisdictions should permit lawyers and nonlawyers to split fees.
This would lead to more efficient and cost-effective service,24
allowing law firms in the United States to remain globally
competitive."9 If law firms in the United States are not permitted
to function as MDPs, corporations will be forced to look overseas
for integrated professional services. Furthermore, as indicated in
recommendation three, the most critical aspect for an MDP to
function properly is joint liability of the partners. Professionals in
a fee-sharing environment would have a vested interest in
providing high quality services while being cognizant all the while
of potential liability.
While some argue that Enron may forever end the MDP
debate,25 I believe that Enron may serve as a tool for developing
clear professional ethical guidelines and therefore may provide
other jurisdictions with the incentive to move forward on this issue.
For these rules to reflect the reality of the business world, lawyers
and other professionals knowledgeable about the inner workings of
business transactions should take an active role in this debate.
The MDP debate is about how best to preserve the
profession's core values while meeting the needs of today's clients
in a world of increasingly complex legal problems and business
transactions. In order to do this, the organized bar must take
action if it wishes to remain relevant in the debate."' The four
248. See supra text accompanying note 63.
249. See supra text accompanying note 82.
250. See supra text accompanying note 225.
251. See supra text accompanying note 82; see also Schneyer, supra note 26, at
1474 (observing that powerful economic forces are pushing for the adoption of
MDPs); Julian Lonbay, Lawyer Ethics in the Twenty-First Century: The Global
Practice Reconciling Regulatory and Deontological Differences- The European
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steps outlined above will enable the bar to regulate MDPs and
streamline the delivery of professional services,252 helping
American firms remain competitive in today's complex
transnational marketplace.
Experience, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 907, 908 (2001) (observing that for U.S.
law firms to remain competitive in a global market, it is important for the bar to
permit MDPs).
252. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 65.
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